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Abstract.  Scale is of great importance to the analysis of real world 
phenomena, be they enduring objects or perduring processes.  This paper 
presents a new perspective on the concept of scale by considering it within two 
complementary ontological views.  The first, called SNAP, recognizes enduring 
entities or objects, the other, called SPAN, perduring entities or processes.  
Within the meta-theory provided by the complementary SNAP and SPAN 
ontologies, we apply different theories of formal ontology such as mereology 
and granular partitions, and ideas derived from hierarchy theory.  These 
theories are applied to objects and processes and form the framework within 
which we present tentative definitions of scale, which are found to differ 
between the two ontologies.                                                                     
       Keywords.   scale, granularity, hierarchy, process, ontology, mereology 
1  Introduction 
For geography as an empirical science, the observation of enduring entities and 
processes at different levels of granularity is of critical importance. Given a certain 
range of resolution only processes and enduring entities at certain levels of granularity 
can be observed. In geography this kind of problem is referred to as the problem of 
scale of observation, which has long been recognized as a central problem of the 
analysis of geographical phenomena.  The concept of scale is controversial in its 
definition and often applied without clarification of its meaning (Lam and Quattrochi 
1992).  The meaning of scale discussed in this paper is not the traditional cartographic 
notion of scale, but rather the level at which reality is sampled and observed 
(Goodchild and Proctor 1997).  Thus, scale is defined by and incorporates both grain 
and extent, spatial and temporal (Ahl and Allen 1996; Albrecht and Car 1999; Pereira 
2002).   
 
 
In this paper we apply different theories of formal ontology such as mereology 
(Simons 1987) and granular partitions (Bittner and Smith 2001; Smith and Brogaard 
2002), as well as hierarchy theory (Allen and Starr 1982, Ahl and Allen 1996), within 
the overarching framework of spatio-temporal ontology (Bittner and Smith 2003) in 
the context of considering the problem of scale.  Our objective is to determine 
whether the combination of these theories provides new insights into the issue of 
scale.  The aspect of scale that is focused upon is the linkage between scales, that is, 
the relationship between objects operating at large scales and small scales, and the 
relationship between processes operating at large scales and small scales.    We 
consider a definition of scale for both enduring entities, such as humans and 
mountains, and processes, such as tidal currents and gentrification, within their 
formalization in different kinds of ontologies (SNAP-ontologies for enduring entities 
and SPAN-ontologies for processes). 
 
The paper is structured as follows, Section 2 describes the notions of grain and 
extent and their use in the paper.  Section 3 introduces the SPAN and SNAP 
ontologies as formal ways of representing objects and processes.  Section 4 clarifies 
the notion of scale with regards to objects in a SNAP ontology, and Section 5 
explores scale with regards to processes in a SPAN ontology.  Section 6 concludes the 
paper. 
2  Grain and Extent 
Extent is concerned with the spatial size of phenomena, in (x,y,z) dimensions, or the 
temporal length of duration over which those phenomena operate (Lam and 
Quattrochi 1992).  For example, continental glaciers operate over a much larger 
extent, both spatial and temporal, than thunderstorms.  Both spatial and temporal 
extent are referenced to an absolute space and time for the purpose of this paper.  
Grain, whether spatial or temporal, is a relative notion.  That is, it has no absolute 
spatial or temporal location in the sense of being positioned on the earth at a certain 
longitude or latitude, or at a certain Greenwich Mean Time.  Such positioning is 
defined by extent. 
 
Grain refers to the fineness of distinctions recorded in the data, often referred to as 
resolution (Albrecht and Car 1999).  For example, the spatial grain of a remotely 
sensed image is the size of each pixel in its relation to the patch of the earth it 
represents. Determining which spatial grain is appropriate for a certain observation is 
dependent on the spatial extent of the objects to be observed, that is, the spatial grain 
of our observation depends upon the granular structure of reality.  Temporal grain 
refers to the frequency of behavior.  For example, the temporal grain of a longitudinal 
study of the daily patterns of human movement is the frequency of observation or 
sampling.  Determining which temporal grain is appropriate for a certain observation 
is dependent on the temporal extent of the objects to be observed, that is, the temporal 
grain of our observation depends upon the granular structure of reality in the sense 
that only a certain range of temporal grain is appropriate for the observation of 
temporal objects of a certain temporal extent.  Frequency is traditionally defined as 
       
 
the number of cycles a phenomenon completes within a specified time interval.  In 
the context of this paper, fast behavior is defined by high frequency and slow 
behavior by low frequency (Ahl and Allen 1996). For example, the movement of a 
glacier occurs at a much lower frequency than the ephemeral cusp formation at a 
beach. 
 
The determination of the appropriate scale of analysis is fundamental to the 
analysis of all geographic phenomena.  It is typically dependent on the objectives and 
resources of the research at hand.  The effects of the scale of observation on 
geographic phenomena are well recognized and pertain to a common recognition that 
different processes are observed to operate at different scales, thus phenomena or 
processes may be obscured when research is concentrated at an inappropriate scale 
(Meyer et al. 1992).  For example, an exclusive analysis of microclimates may lead to 
explanation based on local processes when there are processes of large extent, such as 
El Niño, that are influencing or controlling the microclimate and should be observed 
with coarser granularity.  Although the problem of scale definition is well recognized, 
it continues as an unsolved problem, thus it remains a topical issue.  Many questions 
continue unresolved from more recent initiatives such as NCGIA’s (National Center 
for Geographic Information Analysis) Varanius project: Scale and Detail in the 
Cognition of Geographic Information, and the UCGIS (University Consortium for 
Geographic Information Science) research priority of scale (UCGIS 1998). 
3  Two Ontological Views 
Following Bittner and Smith (2003) we recognize two complementary views of the 
world, one directed towards enduring entities, or objects, and the other directed 
towards perduring entities, or processes.  Taken together these two kinds of 
ontologies capture both enduring entities, such as political boundaries and humans, 
and spatio-temporal processes, such as erosion and urban sprawl. The former view 
gives raise to a series of snapshot-like ontologies called SNAP, each representing 
objects existing at a certain moment in time. The latter view presents an ontology 
called SPAN, which represents processes and other spatio-temporal entities as four-
dimensional worms. 
 
To describe geographic processes in an appropriate and complete manner we 
cannot have a SPAN ontology without the SNAP ontology and vice versa.  For 
example, the processes of migration and gentrification cannot be understood without 
the enduring entities of humans, which are involved in these processes.  Likewise, we 
cannot understand the interaction of sedimentary particles in the littoral zone of a 
coast without understanding processes such as longshore drift, rip currents, and mass 
transport.  Thus the interaction between processes, enduring entities, and changes in 
enduring entities – which is related to participation in certain processes – is critical. 
 
SNAP-ontologies are an intuitive approach to the world that is reflected in how we 
experience reality at every given moment in time, and corresponds to the way we 
 
typically model it: as a collection of interacting enduring entities and the relations 
between them.  The temporal character of the world is reflected by a series of three-
dimensional temporal slices or snap-shots of enduring entities.  Considering 
sequences of 3D-SNAPshots is the common approach to modeling processes in 
Geographic Information Systems (GIS); for example, in trying to model the 
demographics of a region over time we use snapshots of the state of the region at 
specified time intervals such as with census data.  An important aspect is that 
processes are not represented in ontologies of the SNAP kind, although they can be 
discovered indirectly in terms of the changes they cause.  Change is hereby defined as 
the difference in some attribute in an enduring entity at different time indexes, be that 
spatial location or some other property of the entity. 
 
SPAN-ontologies are derived from four-dimensionalism, a popular position in 
contemporary analytic metaphysics (see Sider 2001).  The four-dimensionalist views 
the world from a God’s eye perspective, as spread out in time and populated by space-
time worms that represent processes.  Time is considered as just another dimension in 
addition to the three spatial dimensions, as in the theory of relativity.  Hence this is an 
atemporal view where things that are spread out over time are said to perdure.  This 
does not deny the temporal extension of spatio-temporal entities, rather that their 
traditional temporal qualifiers of past, present, and future are traced over because all 
are simultaneously evident.   
 
Another important aspect is that SPAN ontologies trace over enduring entities.  For 
example, a flood event described by a SPAN ontology traces over the existence of 
enduring entities such as water bodies.  However there exist complex 
interrelationships between SNAP and SPAN ontologies.  Enduring entities at every 
moment in time have a corresponding three dimensional slice of the processes they 
participate in.  For example, enduring entities such as humans or animals participate 
in migration processes.  One cannot reduce one view to the other.  Rather one must 
translate between SNAP and SPAN ontologies, requiring an analysis of cross-
ontological relationships between those different ontological views on a meta-
theoretical level in order to establish a relationship between them, which will not be 
discussed in this paper (see Bittner and Smith 2003 for details).  This is evident in the 
difficulties that GIS have with temporal phenomena because the process view of the 
world cannot be reconstructed with the view of enduring entities without losing 
something.   
 
Within each ontology, scale is defined differently.  We give a provisional 
definition of scale within the SNAP ontology, in terms of classes of objects.  Here 
scale is a set of levels of granularity composed of objects that can be distinguished at 
these levels of granularity with observation or measurement within a certain range of 
spatial grain. 
       
 
4  SNAP Objects, Granularity, and Scale 
We begin with a discussion of the granular structure of enduring entities, which is 
developed by applying the theories of mereology and granular partitions.  Within this 
context the notion of scale is considered. The presented notions will then be extended 
to Section 5 in order to take into account the more complex granular structure of 
processes. 
4.1 Mereology and granularity trees 
Our basic tool for understanding the phenomenon of granularity is mereology 
(Simons, 1987).  The most basic mereological concept is the relation of part to whole.  
The concept of part and whole applies in every domain, from ordinary objects such as 
people, chairs, and mangos, to processes such as frontal systems, information flows, 
and erosion.  They may also apply to abstract entities such as classes and properties. 
In this section only enduring entities will be considered. 
 
The simplest expression of this part-whole relation is given by ≤, where x ≤ y is 
read as ‘ x is a part of y ’.  For example, if a house (an enduring entity) is considered 
a whole, its doors, roof, and windows are parts of that whole.  The relation ≤ includes 
both the case of proper parthood (<) and equality.  The core axioms define the part-
whole relation as reflexive, transitive, and antisymmetric, i.e., as a partial ordering 
(Simons 1987).  In the context of this paper we are not interested in mereology in its 
whole generality but in hierarchical structures which represent mereological structure 
in a restricted form: as finite trees.  Those structures are subject to the features of 
granularity.  
 
Formally we define a granularity tree as a pair, ( ),G R= ⊆ , where R  is a set of 
objects with a binary relation ⊆  which is a restricted form of the mereological part-of 
relation.  Following Smith and Brogaard (2002), we call the objects forming a system 
of granularities, cells, and the relation ⊆ , the subcell relation. Using the subcell 
relation we define the relations of overlap, proper subcell, and immediate proper 
subcell. 
  
D1 O xy ≡ ∃z (z ⊆ x ∧ z ⊆ y) 
 D2 x ⊂ y ≡ x ⊆ y ∧ x ≠ y 
 D3 x ⊂I y ≡ x ⊂ y ∧ ¬∃z(x ⊂ z ∧ z ⊂ y) 
 
We here assume that quantification ranges over entities in R. Moreover we assume 
that leading quantifiers are understood. Two cells overlap if and only if they have a 
subcell in common (D1). The cell x is a proper subcell of the cell y if and only if x is 
a subcell of y and x and y are not identical (D2). The cell x is an immediate subcell of 
y if and only if x is a proper subcell of y and there does not exist a cell z such that x is 
a proper subcell of z and z is a proper subcell of y.  
 
We continue by defining the predicates ‘being a root element’ and ‘being an atom’: 
  
D4 Root x ≡ ∀y (y ⊆ x) 
 D5 Atom x ≡ ¬∃y ( y ⊂ x) 
 
An entity is a root if and only if all entities are its subcells (D4). An entity is an atom 
if and only if it does not have a proper subcell. 
 
Granularity trees are governed by the following axioms (Bittner and Smith (2003):  
 
G1 x ⊆ x 
G2 x ⊆ y ∧ y ⊆ x → x = y 
G3 x ⊆ y ∧ y ⊆ z → x ⊆ z 
G4 ∃x ( Root x) 
G5 O xy → x ⊆ y ∨ y ⊆ x 
G6 x ⊂ y → ∃z (z ⊂ y ∧ ¬O zx) 
G7  ∃y (Atom y ∧ y  ⊆ x)  
 
(G1-G3) ensure that the subcell relation is reflexive, antisymmetric, and transitive, 
i.e., a partial ordering. That there is a root element is guaranteed by (G4). Axiom (G5) 
ensures that if two cells overlap then one is a subcell of the other. This excludes 
partial overlap. For this reason there cannot be circles and the resulting structure is a 
tree. (G6) is known in the literature as the weak supplementation principle (Simons, 
1987). It ensures that if a cell has a proper subcell then it has at least two non-
overlapping proper subcells. For this reason the resulting tree structure cannot 
degenerate into a list. (G7) ensures that every cell has an atom as subcell. 
Consequently, every cell is connected to the root cell by a finite chain of immediate 
subcells. This axiom might be disputable and is from a formal point of view not 
needed for the discussion that follows. However we believe that it is an important 
aspect of granularity that the subdivision into parts stops after finite steps. 
 
Given those axioms one can prove that the root element is unique and that the 
strong supplementation principle holds, from which the extensionality of the overlap 
and the proper part relation follows (Simons, 1987). 
 
It follows that every granularity tree can be represented using a tree structure in the 
mathematical sense, that is, as rooted directed graphs without circles, by taking the 
regions as nodes and by demanding that there is an edge from node a  to node b  if 
and only if a b⊆ .  For example, the parts of London may be referred to as 
‘boroughs’, such as Westminster, Camden, Southwark, and Greenwich.  The parts of 
these boroughs are referred to as ‘suburb’, for example, in the case of the borough of 
Camden, we find suburbs such as Kingcross, Hampstead Heath, Swiss Cottage, and 
Euston, which belong to such a system of granularities (Figure 1).  Thus, we can 
describe London at varying levels of granularity, the composition of which defines 
our granularity tree.   
 
       
 
Granularity trees have finite depth, where depth is defined as the maximal length of 
the finite chain from the root to a leaf.  Therefore the granularity tree can be described 
as having finite grain, that is, the range of grain (from largest to smallest) of a 
granularity tree is defined.  Thus parts of the structured domain that are below a 
certain grain are not recognized in the tree in the sense that they are not cells of the 
tree connected to the root.  For example, the parts of Euston are not recognized by the 
granularity tree in Figure 1.  However, this granularity tree is not full, that is, its 
subcells do not exhaustively describe each cell (Bittner and Smith 2001).  For 




Camden Westminster Greenwich Southwark 
Swiss Cottage Euston Hampstead Heath Kingscross 
 
Fig. 1. London depicted as a granularity tree 
 
Another example of granularity tree may be found in the classification of channel 
geomorphology (Montgomery and Buffington 1998).  The watershed is the root of 
this granularity tree, which may be divided into sub-watersheds, sub-watersheds 
having valley segments as their parts, which are in turn composed of channel reaches, 





Valley Segment Valley Segment Valley Segment 
channel reach channel reach 
channel unit channel unit channel unit channel unit 
 
Fig. 2. Geomorphological granularity tree 
 
Take for example the Chesapeake Bay Watershed, the sub-watersheds in this 
watershed include the Potomac River, Susquehanna, York, and James.  In the 
Potomac River sub-watershed, valley segments may include the north and south fork 
of the Shenandoah river, Monocacy River, Anacostia River, and the lower Potomac 
River (Figure 3).  This granularity tree could be expanded to include channel reaches 





Potomac River James Susquehanna York 
Monocacy River Anacostia River Lower Potomac 
 
 
       
 
Fig. 3. Chesapeake Bay described as a granularity tree 
 
The example of the Chesapeake Bay provides grounds for introducing the 
distinction between bona fide and fiat granularity trees.  The objects within the 
granularity tree can be either bona fide or fiat (Smith 1995; Bittner and Smith 2001).  
Bona fide objects exist independently of human partitioning activity, take for example 
the Potomac River, which exists regardless of how it may be organized into a 
granularity tree.  Fiat objects are created by our partitioning activity, for example the 
census units used to divide the population into spatial partitions.  Orthogonal to this 
division between bona fide and fiat objects is the division of hierarchies into 
hierarchies of kinds (taxonomies) and hierarchies of parts (partonomies) (Tversky 
1990).  A taxonomy is the partitioning of reality into kinds, for example a poodle is a 
kind of dog, which is a kind of animal.  A partonomy is the partitioning of reality into 
parts.  The Geomorphologic granularity tree (Figure 2), instantiated by the 
Chesapeake Bay granularity tree (Figure 3), is an example of a partonomy.   
4.2 Levels of granularity 
Let ( ),GG R= ⊆  be a granularity tree and let RG be non-empty. Levels of 
granularity in G  are then defined as sets of cells inductively as follows (Rigaux and 
Scholl 1995):   
 
1. The set containing only the root cell of the granularity tree is a level of 
granularity 
2. Let C  be a level of granularity consisting of the cells z1,…,zn. Then we can 
replace every zi by its immediate subcells (if it has any) and the result is 
another level of granularity. 
 
 Consider Figure 1; the levels of granularity, for example, are: 
 
0g   { }London  
1g   { }, , ,Westminster Camden Southwark Greenwich    





        (1) 
 
 
Our definition captures only certain necessary conditions that characterize levels of 
granularity, which are purely mereological in nature:  
 
1. The elements forming a level of granularity are pair-wise disjoint 
 
2. Levels of granularity are exhaustive in the sense that for every cell z that 
does not belong to the granularity-level δ=(z1,…zk) there exists a cell zi∈δ 
such that zi ⊆ z or z ⊆ zi. 
 
Our definition, so far is relatively rough, for example, the lengths of each finite 
chain that connect each leaf cell to the root cell in the granularity tree are not equal.  
This results in the problem of objects being repeated at a number of levels of 
granularity.  In the London example, Westminster, Southwark, and Greenwich, are 
repeated in level 2g  after their initial appearance in level 1g .   
 
For a more complete characterization of levels of granularity more domain-specific 
properties need to be taken into account. In SNAP domains metrical notions could 
also be included, for example, we might impose the requirement that objects forming 
a certain level of granularity have roughly the same size. In SPAN domains, as we 
shall see in Section 5 below, specific properties of the processes studied need to be 
considered.    
4.3 Resolution of observation and scale 
With the organization of objects into a granularity tree we return to the distinction 
between the granular structure of reality and the resolution of observation that was 
introduced in the introduction.  Given a bona fide granularity tree, its ability to reflect 
the granular structure of reality that we wish to describe depends on the resolution of 
observation.  Objects of human scale, such as books, filing cabinets, elephants, and 
anything else at the level of Zubin’s A-spaces (Zubin 1989), are observable by 
humans without other instruments.  Objects of larger scale, such as cities, watersheds, 
and islands, and of smaller scale, such as cells, bacteria, and atoms, require a different 
resolution of observation that depends on scale specific observation tools. 
 
Scale, then, is determined by the relationship between the granular structure of 
reality and the resolution of observation.  Returning to the provisional definition given 
at the end of Section 3, scale is a set of levels of granularity in the defined granularity 
tree that is partitioned into equivalence classes that are distinguished on the granular 
structure of reality through a certain range of resolution of observation.  For example, 
human scale, as a class of levels of granularity, is composed of objects that can be 
distinguished on the granular structure of reality through a range of resolution defined 
by the limits of our perception. 
 
The notion of scale discussed here only recognizes the relative extent and grain of 
objects based on their description as a granularity tree. The root cell in a system of 
cells is of greater relative scale than its children, as are any lower levels of granularity 
with respect to their descendents.  Thus, going down the levels of granularity from the 
root cell, with coarsest relative granularity, to leaf-cells of finest relative granularity, 
the granularity tree is organized from phenomena of large relative extent to 
phenomena of small relative extent.  For example, London is much larger than any of 
its descendents (Westminster, Camden, Southwark, Greenwich) taken individually.  
       
 
We may then define scale on our system of granularities as the partition of the set of 
levels of granularities into equivalence classes observable at a certain range of 
resolution, where from the root cell to depth x is scale 1, from depth x to y is scale 2.  
However, the definition of these depths is not specified in mereology, the observer 
defines them. 
5  SPAN Processes, Granularity, and Scale  
As with Section 4, we begin by discussing granular structures using the theories of 
mereology and granular partitions, however here we focus on perduring entities or 
processes.  Within the framework provided by these theories of formal ontology 
applied to processes, the notion of scale is considered.  
5.1 Process mereology 
In geography we are typically interested in perduring entities, or processes, rather 
than in enduring entities, or objects.  Spatio-temporal entities, or processes, are best 
described by a SPAN-ontology.  We may also distinguish between processes and 
classes of processes.  For example, tropical cyclones are a class of processes and 
tropical cyclone Paka is an instance of this class.   
 
As with the mereology of enduring entities, the relations of parthood and proper 
parthood also apply to the processes, or perduring entities, of a SPAN-ontology.  
However, the mereological part-of relation behaves differently in SNAP and SPAN 
ontologies in the sense that enduring entities have only spatial parts. Perduring 
entities, in contrast, also have temporal parts.  For example, a temporal part of a 
process such as gentrification may be the temporal interval over which rent is 
increased by a certain amount; another temporal part of that same process may the 
temporal interval over which inhabitants are evicted.   
 
This means that in the domain of enduring entities, granularity is a spatial notion, 
whereas it is a spatio-temporal notion in the domain of processes.  These processes 
have spatial and temporal extent and spatial and temporal grain, and are structured 
mereologicaly.  Therefore their organization into a tree of granularity must consider 
both their spatial and temporal extent and their spatial and temporal grain. 
5.2 Hierarchy theory and processes 
In descriptions of the process class of urban growth we can move from the level of 
granularity defined by processes at the neighborhood level to that level defined by 
processes observed at the metropolitan statistical area level. Or, in the case of weather 
phenomena, we can describe them at the granularity of microclimates or large-scale 
phenomena such as the El Niño weather pattern.  The part-whole nature of these 
processes defines the hierarchy, or granularity tree, that they compose (note that 
 
hierarchy and granularity tree are taken to be synonymous).  The organization of 
processes into a hierarchy is developed in hierarchy theory.  Hierarchy theory, 
propounded by Ahl and Allen (1996) and Allen and Star (1982), is based on the 
recognition that processes, spatio-temporal phenomena such as urban growth or 
weather phenomena, can be described at different levels of granularity.   
 
There is a strong consonance between hierarchy theory, mereology, and granular 
partitions, at least at the conceptual level.  Simon (1973), one of the foundational 
thinkers of hierarchy theory, uses some of the mereological basics and the tree-like 
systems of granularities, defining a hierarchy as a partial ordering, a tree.  The basic 
mereological axioms, noted above in Section 3.1, hold true for hierarchy theory, 
however, hierarchy theory does not formalize these relationships between parts and 
wholes in any form of explicit calculus.  Its novelty lies in its rules for the 
organization of these parts and wholes into a hierarchy of spatio-temporal processes.  
We interpret hierarchy theory as an extension to mereology-based notions of 
parthood, scale, and levels of granularity with the specification of the relationship 
between levels, thereby extending our definition of scale above.  It defines a number 
of ordering principles of upper levels relative to lower levels of granularity for 
processes (Ahl and Allen 1996).  In this paper we will focus on two of these 
principles, that is, higher levels in the hierarchy behave at lower frequency than lower 
levels, and, as with mereological structure, higher levels contain processes at lower 
levels as parts.  Our granular structure is defined by both spatial and temporal grain 
and extent. 
5.3 Granularity trees formed by processes 
Processes have sub-processes as their parts.  We organize processes and their parts 
into granularity trees using spatio-temporal grain and extent, extending beyond the 
granular structure of enduring entities by paying particular attention to temporal grain, 
or frequency.  Frequency, as described in Section 2, is traditionally defined as the 
number of cycles a phenomenon completes within a specified time.  Therefore, 
processes of high frequency are characterized by fast behavior where processes recur 
within a short duration of time, and processes of low frequency are characterized by 
slow behavior where processes recur within a long duration of time.  For example, 
tides are a low frequency class of processes, oscillating over a 12 hour period, 
compared to the relative high frequency of a wave, which recurs over mere seconds.   
 
Extending this notion of the frequency of a process hierarchically, each process is 
composed of a pattern of processes at a lower level of granularity, the parts of the 
process.  A pattern of processes, then, is a sequence of different individual processes.  
The frequency of a process is the reoccurrence of the pattern of processes that it is 
composed of.  Take, for example, a typhoon, which is a class of processes that have a 
certain lifecycle they undergo, which are characterized by a certain pattern of 
processes.  The pattern of processes of a typhoon is likely to include a tropical 
depression and a tropical storm.  The frequency of a typhoon is then the reoccurrence 
of the same pattern of processes.   
       
 
 
Processes of low frequency, which recur over a long duration of time, are higher in 
the granularity tree than processes of high frequency, which recur over a short 
duration of time.  This relationship between process at a higher level in the granularity 
tree and patterns of individual processes at a lower level is repeated down through the 
granularity tree. For example the temporal grain or frequency of atmospheric 
phenomena are typically classified as micro-scale: seconds to minutes, meso-scale: 
minutes to days, synoptic scale: days to weeks, and macro-scale: weeks and greater 
(Ahrens 1991).  Another example of a system of granularities is defined on coastal 
processes.  Consider the tidal cycle in the Bay of Fundy as a granularity tree (Figure 
4).  Note that this is a class of processes that can be applied to any instance of a tidal 
cycle in the Bay of Fundy.  One tidal cycle occurs over almost a 13-hour period, the 
parts of which are its currents which have a higher frequency, followed by the sub-
processes of waves which have a higher frequency again (Figure 5).  The difficulty 
with finding an appropriate geographic example is that few researchers describe 
processes hierarchically, thus the example given above is very incomplete and 



























Fig. 5. A pattern of wave processes superimposed on the tide process 
 
The temporal frequency of processes often reflects their spatial and temporal 
extent.  Processes that are higher in our granularity tree are not only characterized by 
lower temporal frequency but also greater extent, thus processes that are lower in the 
system have higher frequency and smaller spatial and temporal extent.  This reflects a 
well recognized principle whereby phenomena that are large in space, such as El 
Niño, have a low frequency, whereas small phenomena, such as micro-climates, have 
a higher frequency (Meyer et al. 1992).  For example, take the classification of 
channel geomorphology, which incorporates both the structural geomorphology and 
the functional geomorphic processes operating at each level.  The processes operating 
in a channel unit are contained, spatially and temporally, in those of a channel reach, 
which are contained within those processes operating in a valley segment, and so 
forth within a watershed and a geomorphic province (Montgomery and Buffington 
1998).   Similarly, in the Bay of Fundy example it can be said that the tidal cycle 
contains all of the lower processes in the granularity tree within its temporal and 
spatial extent.   
 
A system of process granularities is a pair, ( , )pG P= ⊆ , where P  is a set of 
processes with a binary relation ⊆  satisfying G1-G7 given above.  As with enduring 
entities, we call the processes forming a system of granularities, cells, and the relation 
⊆ , the subcell relation.  However, for processes this subcell relation has to obey 
 tide processes 
time 
wave processes 
       
 
additional constraints which are defined in terms of spatial grain and extent and 
temporal grain and extent, where a subcell must: 
 
1. have smaller temporal extent 
2. have smaller spatial extent 
3. have greater temporal frequency, or finer temporal grain 
4. have greater spatial resolution, or finer spatial grain 
5.5 Levels of process granularity 
The nature of the part-whole relationship for processes, beyond the requirements of 
mereology, can then be summarized as: a part is contained within the spatial and 
temporal extent of the whole and has a higher frequency (temporal grain) and higher 
resolution (spatial grain) than the whole.  In mereology, the parts exhaustively sum to 
the whole, such as the full granularity tree for London that would include all of its 32 
Boroughs completely covering London’s spatial extent.  In contrast, the granularity 
tree that is formed by processes is not spatio-temporally exhaustive.  
 
Within a granularity tree we can distinguish levels of granularity at which certain 
processes reside.  Because of the added temporal dimensions of processes, our 
organization of processes into a granularity tree reflects this temporality.  The 
sequence of processes that composes a process at a higher level has the requirement 
of having the same (or a similar range of) frequency or temporal granularity, which is 
the primary organizing construct of the granularity tree.  Thus the levels in a 
granularity tree and the depth of each level is defined by the frequency of the process, 
that is, the recurrence of a sequence or pattern of sub-processes that compose a 
process.  The approach for slicing a granularity tree into levels defined in Section 4.2 
applies to processes also. 
5.6 Process, resolution of observation, and scale 
As with objects, in Section 4.3, our definition of a system of spatio-temporal 
granularity that reflects the granular structure of reality depends on the resolution of 
observation.  Processes at different scales require different resolutions of observation.  
However, unlike objects, with processes this notion of resolution is both spatial and 
temporal, that is, both spatial and temporal extent and spatial and temporal grain must 
be considered.  For example, processes of human scale are observable without other 
instruments, such as the cusp formation at a beach, or pedestrian traffic along a 
limited stretch of pavement.  Larger scale processes, such as oceanic circulation and 
urban sprawl, and smaller scale processes such as cancer or the migration of dust 
mites, require a different resolution of observation that depends on spatial and 
temporal scale specific observation tools.  From the perspective of a SPAN-ontology, 
the length of the space-time worm that describes our process defines the temporal 
extent and implies a certain temporal resolution of observation to capture the temporal 
grain of the process.  Likewise, the three dimensional geometry of that space-time 
 
worm defines the spatial extent and therefore implies a certain spatial resolution of 
observation to capture the spatial grain of the process.  As noted earlier, the spatial 
and temporal dimensions are independent.  This inclusion of temporal resolution 
extends to the definition of scale for processes.  For example, human scale processes, 
as a class of levels of spatio-temporal granularity, are composed of processes that can 
be distinguished on the granular structure of reality through a range of spatial and 
temporal resolution that is defined by the spatial and temporal limits of our 
perception.  
 
Given the definition of scale in Section 4.4, it may be extended by considering the 
temporality of processes and by defining the relationship between levels of 
granularity as the frequency of the process under observation.  We may then define 
scale on our system of granularities as the partition of the set of levels of granularities 
into equivalence classes of processes observable within a certain range of frequency 
or temporal granularity.  From the root cell to depth x is scale 1, from depth x to y is 
scale 2.  Frequency classes determine the depths.  More specifically, we may define a 
cut by the natural breaks in the observed frequency of a phenomena, where ‘the 
natural breaking points in systems, the natural surfaces about which systems are 
nearly decomposed, have been identified as portions of the scale gradient which are 
so steep that they can be functionally considered as steps’ (Allen and Star 1982).  
Alternatively, to define the depths of scale we might temporalise other classification 
measures such as Equal Interval or Standard Deviation. 
6  Conclusions 
Understanding the organization of processes into hierarchically structured granularity 
trees, where patterns of sub-processes at finer levels of granularity sum up to 
processes at coarser levels of granularity, helps us to understand the interrelationships 
between phenomena at different levels of granularity.  These granularity trees form a 
framework for partitioning the world of enduring entities, viewed through the SNAP 
ontology, and processes, viewed through the SPAN ontology.  Within both 
ontologies, the spatial and temporal grain of observation identifies the levels of the 
granularity tree.  For enduring entities, their spatial extent and grain defines the 
structure of the granularity tree.  For processes, their spatial and temporal grain and 
spatial and temporal extent defines the structure of the granularity tree. We defined 
scale as the depth between partitioned equivalence classes of either objects or 
processes described by the granularity tree.  
 
It is, however, important to stress that our examples are somewhat simplified and 
completely ignore the issue of vagueness usually involved. This extends beyond 
defining the spatial bounds of objects to include the temporal dimension of defining 
the spatio-temporal bounds of processes.  For example, what defines the beginning of 
a tropical cyclone?  What are the pattern of processes that indicate the precise instant 
of a migration process? 
 
       
 
Other questions that surface from this research include the exploration of bona fide 
and fiat hierarchies and the relationship between them.  Furthermore, consideration 
the influence of varying projections on our hierarchy, not only varying in the sense of 
different views on the same subject matter, but also varying dynamically where scales 
change over time, that is, we have dynamic granularity trees, or dynamic hierarchies.  
Furthermore, the difficulty in finding hierarchical descriptions of processes presents 
the question of whether or not the world is organized hierarchically or whether our 
tools and views are limited. 
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